Statement submitted

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I appear before the subcommittee today to provide my professional analysis of the

current global security environment and future conflict trends, concentrating on

how accurately—in my opinion—America's naval services address both in their

strategic vision and force-structure planning. As has been the case throughout my

two decades of working for, and with, the Department of Navy, current procurement

plans portend a "train wreck" between desired fleet size and likely future budget

levels dedicated to shipbuilding. I am neither surprised nor dismayed by this

current mismatch, for it reflects the inherent tension between the Department's

continuing desire to maintain some suitable portion of its legacy force and its more

recent impulse toward adapting itself to the far more prosaic tasks of integrating

globalization's "frontier areas"—as I like to call them—as part of our nation's

decades-long effort to play bodyguard to the global economy's advance, as well as

defeat its enemies in the "long war against violent extremism" following 9/11. Right

now, this tension is mirrored throughout the Defense Department as a whole: between what Secretary Gates has defined as the "next-war-itis" crowd (primarily Air Force and Navy) and those left with the ever-growing burdens of the long war— namely, the Army and Marines.

It is my sense that the current naval leadership views the global environment with great accuracy, understanding its service role to be one of balancing between four strategic tasks: a) sensibly hedging against the slim possibility of great-power war; b) preparing the force for high-end combat operations against a regional rogue power armed with nascent nuclear weapons capacity; c) supporting/conducting ground operations in the struggle against violent extremism; and d) improving maritime governance and security in those regions where today it remains virtually non-existent (e.g., most of Africa's coastline). Using the vernacular of my published works*, I consider the first two tasks (great-power war, war against regional rogues) to fall under the rubric of America's Leviathan** or big-war force, while the latter

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* See *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (2004), *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating* (2005), and *Great Powers: America and the World After Bush* (2009), all published by G.P. Putnam's Sons.

** The Leviathan refers to the U.S. military's warfighting capacity and the high-performance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor, and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other great-power militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial-era roots to its information-age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision major combat operations. The Leviathan force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. This "overmatch" means, however, that current and future enemies in the long war on violent extremism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States, focusing on its economic interests and citizenry. The Leviathan rules the "first half" of war, but it is often ill suited, by design and temperament, to the "second half" of peace, to include postconflict stabilization-and-reconstruction operations and counterinsurgency campaigns. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force.

two tasks (struggle against extremism, extending governance) define the growing portfolio of our nation's System Administrator* or small-wars force.

Historically, the Department of Navy defined the totality of our nation's would-be System Administrator force, meaning, prior to the World Wars of the 20th century, it was the job of the Navy and Marine Corps to both defend and extend America's commercial networks with the outside world, while the U.S. Army (i.e., Department of War) served mainly as a continental constabulary force that worked to integrate western frontier lands. Those World Wars, in combination with the Cold War, transformed the U.S. Army and its offshoot, the Air Force, into *the* primary Leviathan services vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, while the naval services, despite the grand ambitions of their 1980s Maritime Strategy, were left overwhelmingly in the role of managing the adjacent theaters known as the Third World. At Cold War's end, those naval forces gladly embraced their enduring "SysAdmin" role, portraying themselves as de facto global police capable of handling—on their own—virtually all developing-region crisis scenarios short of regional war. But with the post-9/11 interventions (Iraq, Afghanistan), the Navy quickly saw its global constabulary role

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* System Administrators (SysAdmin) refers to the "second half" blended force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has successfully waged war. Therefore, it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counterinsurgency operations (COIN), and small-scale crisis response. Beyond such military-intensive activities, the SysAdmin force likewise provides civil security with its police component, as well as civilian personnel with expertise in rebuilding networks, infrastructure, and social and political institutions. While the core security and logistical capabilities are derived from uniformed military components, the SysAdmin force is fundamentally envisioned as a standing capacity for interagency (i.e., among various U.S. federal agencies) and international collaboration in nation-building, meaning that both the SysAdmin force and function end up being more civilian than uniform in composition, more government-wide than just Defense Department, more rest-of-the-world than just the United States, and more private-sector-invested than public-sector-funded.

eclipsed by the U.S. Army, as that force, supported by the Marines, once again stepped into its pre-20th-century role as our nation's primary nation-building /occupational/counterinsurgency force—this time on the shifting frontiers of globalization's advance.

Now, the Navy finds itself split between preserving its blue-ocean Leviathan fleet while simultaneously expanding its green/brown-water SysAdmin fleet, the former speaking primarily to 20th-century great-power war scenarios that have lingered despite globalization's deep, pacifying embrace (see my geographic definition of globalization's Functioning Core* in Figure 1 below), while demand for the latter only increases *because* of globalization's historically swift penetration of a raft of previously off-grid, still largely traditional regions (my definition of globalization's Non-Integrated Gap**) where today we locate virtually all of the wars, civil wars, genocide and ethnic "cleansing," mass rape as a tool of terror, children lured or

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* The Functioning Core refers to those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy and that adhere to globalization's emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both "old" and "new," Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South America (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly 4 billion out of a global population of more than 6 billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil, and Russia. There is no substantial threat of intra-Core war among these great powers. However, there remain competing rule sets regarding what constitutes proper Core interventions inside the Gap, as recently indicated by Russia's contested intervention in Georgia's ongoing civil strife.

** The Non-Integrated Gap refers to those regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrated Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of the Southeast Asian littoral. These regions constitute globalization's "ozone hole," where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just as there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Core defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

forced into combat activity, acts of terrorism, exporters of illegal narcotics, UN

peacekeeping efforts, and 95 percent of U.S. military overseas interventions since

1990.

Figure 1: The Pentagon's New Map (2004)

The Pentagon's New Map:
War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century

As someone who helped write the Department of Navy's white paper, ...*From the*

Sea, in the early 1990s and has spent the last decade arguing that America's grand

strategy should center on fostering globalization's advance, I greatly welcome the

Department's 2007 Maritime Strategic Concept that stated:

United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.

Rather than merely focusing on whatever line-up of rogue powers constitutes today's most pressing security threats, the Department's strategic concept locates its operational center of gravity amidst the most pervasive and persistently revolutionary dynamics associated with globalization's advance around the planet, for it is primarily in those frontier-like regions currently experiencing heightened levels of integration with the global economy (increasingly as the result of Asian economic activity, not Western) that we locate virtually all of the mass violence and instability in the system.

Moreover, this strategic bias toward globalization's Gap regions (e.g., a continuous posturing of "credible combat power" in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean) and SysAdmin-style operations there makes eminent sense in a time horizon likely to witness the disappearance of the three major-war scenarios that currently justify our nation's continued funding of our Leviathan force— namely, China-Taiwan, Iran, and North Korea. First, the Taiwan scenario increasingly bleeds plausibility as that island state seeks a peace treaty with the mainland and proceeds in its course of economic integration with China. Second, as Iran moves ever closer to achieving an A-to-Z nuclear weapon capability, America

finds itself effectively deterred from major war with that regime (even as Israel will likely make a show—largely futile—of delaying this achievement through conventional strikes sometime in the next 12 months). Meanwhile, the six-party talks on North Korea have effectively demystified any potential great-power war scenarios stemming from that regime's eventual collapse, as America now focuses largely on the question of "loose nukes" and China fears only that Pyongyang's political demise might reflect badly on continued "communist" rule in Beijing— hardly the makings of World War III.

As the Leviathan's primary warfighting rationales fade with time, its proponents will seek to sell both this body and the American public on the notion of coming "resource wars" with other great powers. This logic is an artifact from the Cold War era, during which the notion of zero-sum competition for Third World resources held significant plausibility primarily because economic connectivity between the capitalist West and the socialist East was severely limited. But as the recent financial contagion proved, that reality no longer exists (see Figure 2 below). The level of financial interdependence across globalization's Functioning Core, in addition to the supply-chain connectivity generated by globally integrated production lines, renders moot the specter of zero-sum resource competition among the world's great powers. If anything, global warming's long-term effects on agricultural production around the planet will dramatically increase both East-West and North-South interdependency as a result of the emerging global middle class's burgeoning demand for higher caloric intake/resource-intensive foodstuffs. To the

extent that rising demand goes unmet or Gap regions suffer significant resource

shortages in the future, we are exceedingly unlikely to see resumed great-power

conflict as a result. Rather, we are likely to witness even more destabilizing civil

strife in many fragile states (a situation to which even rising great powers such as

Brazil, Russia, India and China could return under the right macro-economic

conditions), thus additionally increasing the SysAdmin force's global workload and

triggering further Pentagon resource shifts from the underutilized Leviathan force.

Naturally, the same could be said about the legacy of today's global economic crisis.

Figure 2: Initial market declines during 2008 global financial crisis, Core-Gap superimposed

(Source: Wall Street Journal, 13 October 2008)

In sum, I see a future in which the SysAdmin side of the ledger (more Green than

Blue) experiences continued significant growth in its global workload, while the

Leviathan (more Blue than Green) experiences the opposite. As such, the U.S.

Government's ongoing budget woes, in combination with the rising costs associated

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with equipping the Leviathan force (e.g., incredibly expensive capital ships), means that the Leviathan's platform numbers will shrink significantly over the next couple decades while the SysAdmin's numbers (a cheaper mix of smaller and more disposable/unmanned platforms) will rise dramatically—along with personnel requirements (already seen with the move to add 92,000 ground troops). As a result, America's "soft power" military resources will grow in size and capabilities, over time generating pressure to create some new bureaucratic entity more operationally in line with such activities—namely, somewhere between our current departments of "peace" (State) and "war" (Defense).

As for the Department of Navy's current force-structure plan, I think it's safe to say that our naval Leviathan force enjoys a significant—as in, *several times over*—advantage over any other force out there today. As such, our decisions regarding new capital ship development and procurement should center largely on the issue of preserving industrial base. My strategic advice is that America should go as low and as slow as possible in the production of such supremely expensive platforms, meaning we accept that our low number of per-class buys will be quite costly. To the extent that ship or aircraft numbers are kept up or even expanded in aggregate, I believe such procurement should largely benefit the SysAdmin force's need for many cheap and small platforms, preferably of the sort that can be utilized by our forces for some suitable period of time and then given away to smaller navies around the world to boost their own capacity for local maritime governance. In other words, we should increasingly make our overall naval force structure

symmetrical to the now-asymmetrical challenges and threats found in globalization's frontier regions (what I call the Gap), our long-term focus being on increasingly the capacity of states there to govern those spaces on their own.

As such, I am a firm believer in Admiral Mike Mullen's notion of the "1,000-ship navy" and the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative, especially when, as a part of such efforts, our naval forces expand cooperation with the navies of rising great powers like China and India, two countries whose militaries remain far too myopically structured around border conflict scenarios (Taiwan for China, Kashmir for India). America must dramatically widen its definition of strategic allies going forward, as the combination of the overleveraged United States and the demographically-moribund Europe and Japan no longer constitutes a global quorum of great powers sufficient to address today's global security agenda.

To conclude, the U.S. Navy faces severe budgetary pressures on future construction of traditional capital ships and submarines. Those pressures will only grow as a result of the current global economic crisis (which—lest we forget—generates similar pressures on navies around the world) and America's continued military operations abroad as part of our ongoing struggle against violent extremism. Considering these trends as a whole, I would rather abuse the Navy—force structure-wise—before doing the same to either the Marine Corps or the Coast Guard. Why? It is my professional opinion that the United States defense community currently accepts far too much risk *and* casualties *and* instability on the

low end of the conflict spectrum while continuing to spend far too much money on building up our combat capabilities for high-end scenarios. In effect, we over-feed our Leviathan force while starving our SysAdmin force, accepting far too many avoidable casualties in the latter while hedging excessively against theoretical future casualties in the former. Personally, I find this risk-management strategy to be both strategically unsound and morally reprehensible.

As this body proceeds in its collective judgment regarding the naval services' long-range force-structure planning, my suggested standard is a simple one: give our forces fewer big ships with fewer personnel on them and many more smaller ships with far more personnel on them. As the Department of Navy *finally* gets around to fulfilling the strategic promise of systematically engaging the littoral ... *from the sea*, doing so in complete agreement—in my professional opinion—with the security trends triggered by globalization's tumultuous advance, I would humbly advise Congress not to stand in its way.